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E-mail address: bbatuman@gmail.comAlthough Ankara has a long history, it is generally known for its twentieth century development as the
designed capital of the newly-born Turkish nation-state. The early episode of the city’s growth displayed
a typical example of modernization with the hand of a determined nationalist government. Yet, the sec-
ond half of the century, also similar to other developing parts of the world, witnessed the uncontrollable
expansion of the city with the emergence of squatter areas. Providing a brief discussion of this history, the
article focuses on the recent developments in Ankara’s urban growth, which was marked by an original
trend in urban politics. A signiﬁcant combination of neoliberal development strategies and Islamist social
welfare policies has emerged in the Turkish cities in the last two decades. Ankara, being the symbol of
republican modernization distinguished with a radical interpretation of secularism, suffers this political
tension and witnesses the social predicaments of an immense transformation shaped by urban regener-
ation projects.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
As the capital city, the history of Ankara in the 20th century is
generally considered to parallel that of republican Turkey. It began
as a declining Ottoman town, although republican historiography
presents it as a city built from scratch. As the symbol of the young
nation, Ankara was always imagined as a tabula rasa and its con-
struction as a modern capital was presented as a concrete signiﬁer
of nation-building. Obviously, Ankara is not unique in terms of
being designed as the capital of a newly established nation-state
(Vale, 1992). Yet, this symbolic weight has affected government
development strategies for the city. In this respect, perhaps the
most curious aspect of Ankara today is its urban development in
the last eighteen years under an Islamist local administration.
While most Turkish cities are currently ruled in the same fashion,
being the symbol of republican modernization marked by a radical
interpretation of secularism, Ankara has suffered the burden of this
political tension. Below, after a brief discussion of the city’s growth
throughout the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, I will analyze the con-
temporary condition of Ankara, the last years of which are marked
by an original combination of neoliberal development strategies
and Islamist social welfare policies. The article is structured in
two major sections: the ﬁrst one providing an historical account
until the 1950s, and the second analyzing the later period through
a number of themes: planning, transportation, local administration
and housing.ll rights reserved.History: Ankara in the early 20th century
Designing a new capital
Before the First World War, Ankara was a small Ottoman town
with a population less than 30,000. In the aftermath, which ended
with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the republicans arrived in
Ankara to pursue a War of Independence. A major factor in the
city’s choice by the republicans was its location at the heart of
the Anatolian peninsula (Fig. 1). Between 1920 and 1923, the city
served as the center of the nationalist struggle and was later de-
clared the capital city of the nation-state. By 1923 the city had al-
ready begun drawing migrants, which would then accelerate,
especially with state ofﬁcials coming from Istanbul. The shortage
of adequate housing for the newcomers also brought about the
need for labor in the construction sector as the population rose
to 75,000 by 1927. For the republican cadres who desired to create
a modern society, the elite newcomers were expected to become a
model for a modern life style. Within this vision, Ankara was de-
sired to be a modernist capital, similar to its European
counterparts.1
In 1924, a plan was produced for the city by the German city
planner Carl Christoph Lörcher. In March 1925, a district of four
million square meters in the southern part of the city was expro-
priated and opened to settlement. Since this development was
not considered in the making of the plan, Lörcher was asked to1 For the story of the planning and the construction of the capital, see Tankut
994).(1
Fig. 1. The location of Ankara (source: Google Earth).
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include government buildings and residences for state employees
(Fig. 2).2 Following the expropriation, the physical and social envi-
ronment in and around Yenisehir began to develop rapidly. While
the old city continued to house the market activities for local people,
Yenisehir sheltered élite residences and government activities. The
railway, which had marked the city limits since its construction in
1893, provided a natural border between the old city and the new
one.
The incoming migration and the rapid growth of the city soon
brought about the need for a comprehensive plan. A committee
was sent to Germany in 1927 to choose and invite prominent
architects to participate in a competition. The winning project,
that of the German planner Hermann Jansen was approved in
1929. In his design, Yenisehir was not proposed as the new center
for Ankara. Instead, the old Citadel was to keep its central role,
while Yenisehir was assigned as the site for a new style of life
(Fig. 3).3
In the 1930s, both the economy and the social life in Ankara be-
gan to ﬂourish. Luxurious hotels and restaurants increased in num-
ber, radio broadcasting was started, and bookstores and cinemas
were opened for the ﬁrst time. With its parks, boulevards and
new buildings Yenisehir especially was a lively environment used
by the élite inhabitants of the district, whose living conditions
were immune even to the Second World War. The continuous
migration to Ankara was also not affected by the War; the city’s
population increased from 157,000 in 1940 to 226,000 in 1945
(Table 1). The new international status quo, however, was to bring
new dynamics into play and to shape Ankara as well as the whole
country.2 For a detailed study of the Lörcher Plan, see Cengizkan (2004).
3 For a social history of Ankara’s development via the analysis of Yenisehir, see
Batuman (2009a).The capital of the capital
After 1945, the Turkish government started a process of struc-
tural adaptation regarding economic and political policies compat-
ible with the Western world. Politically, the single-party rule of the
Republican People’s Party (RPP) that marked the early decades of
republican history came to an end. In 1950, a new party – the Dem-
ocrat Party – came to power and pursued further integration with
the global market. In response to the liberalization of the economy,
American funds ﬂowed into Turkey within the frame of the Mar-
shall Plan.
While the modernization of agriculture created surplus labor, a
new road network also facilitated massive migration to the big cit-
ies. Within a decade (between 1950 and 1960) 1.5 million immi-
grants arrived into urban areas (600,000 into the four largest
cities). The urban population, which was 16.4% in 1927 and had
merely reached 18.5% in 1950, jumped to 25.9% in 1960 (Keles &
Danielson, 1985, p. 28). Neither job opportunities or the housing
stock in major cities were sufﬁcient to accommodate such migra-
tion. The result was the emergence of squatter houses –gecekondu–
(which in Turkish literally means ‘‘landed in one night’’) around the
cities. The inadequacy of regular employment led to the rise of a
‘‘second economy,’’ an informal sector which was characterized
by small-scale service enterprises, labor-intensive employment,
and substantial excess labor (Keles & Danielson, 1985, p. 41). The
immigrants who started to work in such marginal jobs at the
beginning of the 1950s created spaces in all sectors of the urban
economy and became an organic part of urban life.
Since Ankara had experienced a constant level of migration
since the early days of the Republic, it was the ﬁrst to experience
the gecekondu phenomenon (Senyapılı, 2004). In 1950, the popula-
tion of Ankara reached 289,000, which was already beyond the
number projected for 1980 by the Jansen plan. By 1960, it would
reach 650,000. Although Ankara functioned as the political and
Fig. 2. The Lörcher Plan with the limits of the town in 1924. While the town has developed around the old Citadel, the train station was still beyond the city limits (Source:
Cengizkan, 2004). The plan proposed to develop the old city towards the station and planned the development of Yenisehir to the south of the railway, strengthening the
border between Yenisehir and the old city with a green zone. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
580 B. Batuman / Cities 31 (2013) 578–590administrative center of the country, Istanbul remained as the
country’s industrial and business center, its primary port as well
as the center of cultural and intellectual life. As Ankara was seen
as the symbol of the early republican period, the Democrat Party
administration promoted Istanbul rather than Ankara for urban
development, and during the 1950s, public investments ﬂowed
into Istanbul. Ankara’s identiﬁcation with the early republican per-
iod would continue to mark the government attitude towards the
city in the upcoming years.
Nevertheless, Ankara transformed signiﬁcantly during the
1950s. In 1952, Kızılay, the central hub of Yenisehir, was formally
accepted as the Central Business District. Landowners were per-
mitted to build apartment blocks along the boulevard, with shop-
ping arcades on the ground and basement ﬂoors. Consistent with
the conventional ‘‘international’’ image of the CBD, the ﬁrst sky-
scraper of Turkey was also built in Kızılay. Bank branches, upper
class hotels and restaurants, advertising, real estate, foreign and
domestic travel agencies and insurance ofﬁces were opened. On
the upper ﬂoors of apartment buildings, luxury services such as
fashion houses, photographers, and hairdressers replaced resi-
dences (Akçura, 1971, p. 123). This was the shift of the city core
from the old center Ulus to Yenisehir.
By the second half of the 1950s, Ankara had become a large city
with a population of half a million. In the following decades, the
city would witness continuous expansion. While the major force
behind urban growth was state-led industrialization until the
1980s, afterwards it assumed a new form of locally administered
neoliberalization. I will analyze below the urban development ofAnkara after the 1950s, along four themes: planning, transporta-
tion, local administration and housing.
The order of these themes is consciously organized, since they
also represent the priorities of urban growth strategies throughout
the decades that will be discussed. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the
major issues were the expansion and spatial organization of indus-
trial capacities of the city in order to absorb the migrants arriving
in Ankara. This also meant the guidance of the city’s growth out-
side the geographical boundaries deﬁning its core. The physical
expansion of the city also brought in the issue of transportation.
In the 1980s, local administrations were reorganized and granted
new powers in terms of planning as well as budget size. This
allowed them to gradually become the major actors in directing
urban growth. Finally, housing was effectively utilized as a devel-
opment strategy with the unprecedented amount of housing
construction in the 2000s.
Planning
The uncontrollable growth of the city due to in-migration re-
sulted in a second competition for the master plan for Ankara in
1955 by which time both the population rate and the physical
boundaries of the city had expanded beyond the projections of
the Jansen Plan. The winning proposal, which was based on a pop-
ulation projection of 750,000 for the year 2000, would also fail to
foresee and control urban growth. Yet it legalized and systema-
tized a major growth strategy that would mark the development
of not only Ankara but all major Turkish cities. Accordingly, city
Fig. 3. The Jansen plan as approved in 1932. The red boundary illustrates the area included in the Lörcher plan and the hatched areas show the existing settlements in 1932,
which were still relatively small in Yenisehir. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
Population of Ankara.
1927 74,553
1935 122,720
1940 157,242
1945 226,712
1950 288,536
1955 451,241
1960 650,067
1965 905,660
1970 1,236,152
1975 1,606,040
1980 1,800,587
1985 2,228,398
1990 2,559,511
1997 2,917,602
2000 3,203,362
2007 3,763,591
2008 4,194,939
2009 4,306,105
2010 4,431,719
4 For the details of this transformation, see Keyder (1987).
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the existing urban fabric and the construction of high-rise blocks
(Cengizkan, 2005, p. 41). This strategy was already a dominant ten-
dency on the part of landowners, whom the local administrations
chose not to resist but to exploit via the creation of clientelist rela-
tions. In this respect, the plan was in tune with both the expecta-
tions of the landowners and the city administration. From then
on, Turkish cities, and especially the central zones of the major
ones, would develop along with the periodic raising of buildingheights. The surplus rent created with these regulations was the
major force driving urban development.
By the second half of the 1950s, the existing agricultural export
model began to fail and was replaced with a new model of import-
substituting industrialization which would mark the next two dec-
ades.4 This strategy of development was one adopted by many of the
nations that gained independence after 1945 (Roberts, 1989). The
transformation towards planned industrialization required a new
institutional framework, a major element of which was the estab-
lishment of a Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement, separate
from the existing Ministry of Public Works, to direct physical plan-
ning activities in the country.
In 1965, autonomous planning bureaus that would work in
coordination with the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement
were established for Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. The major prob-
lems to be solved by the Ankara Master Plan Bureau were the spa-
tial organization of industrial zones and directing the city’s growth
outwards, since the urban core was already saturated and the city
had reached the limits of the geomorphologic basin in which it was
located. It was proposed to develop the city to the west, the only
direction where the city fringe was not surrounded with squatter
areas (Fig. 4). Industrial and residential zones were proposed along
this axis, and mass housing projects were developed within these
zones. The plan, which targeted the year 1990, was ofﬁcially
approved only in 1982; yet it was inﬂuential in directing the city’s
peripheral development even during the 1970s since the Bureau’s
proposals were followed by the authorities. A green belt was
Fig. 4. The expansion of Ankara and the growth of squatter areas. The red boundaries show the limits of the Jansen plan. The dark areas display the squatter areas in 1965 and
the light shaded ones show their extent in 1990. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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periphery. The most important outcomes of the plan were the sub-
urban sprawl along the Western axis and the moving of industry
out of the city center. While it was intended to build low-income
housing through public investments in the northwest, private sec-
tor middle-class housing projects were encouraged in the south-
west throughout the 1980s. The transfer of industrial production
to the new industrial zones on the periphery continued throughout
the 1990s. While 86% of industrial businesses were within a 10 km.
radius in 1988, by 2007 only 17% were within the 6 km. radius. Be-
tween 1988 and 2007, 58% of the industrial workforce moved out
of the center to peripheral residential areas (Bostan, Erdog˘anaras,
& Tamer, 2010, pp. 88–89).
Another enduring inﬂuence of the 1990 plan was the specializa-
tion of industrial zones. This was especially effective in the growth
of electronics and high-tech military industry after the 1990s.
These investments were also supported with the newly established
technopolises within university campuses, promoting cooperation
with industry. By the mid-1990s, Ankara was already the leader
among Turkish cities in terms of the number of industrial patents
(Armatlı-Körog˘lu, 2006, p. 407).
Although the city developed in line with the decisions of the
plan in the 1970s, the later years of the decade witnessed an urban
crisis that marked all Turkish cities. Although the major dynamics
of this crisis will be discussed below, it has to be noted that it was
only one facet of an overall economic crisis that gradually assumed
the form of social unrest in the country. Within the context of the
ColdWar, the accelerating social movements (which military inter-
vention tried to suppress in 1971) ended with a military coup in
1980. This abolished the constitution, introduced a new (and
anti-libertarian) one and severely curtailed civil rights. The upcom-
ing years would witness gradual economic recovery making use of
neoliberal strategies that made extensive use of urban space.An important component of the transformation of urban devel-
opment was the creation of Greater Municipalities resulting from
the Metropolitan Act of 1984. Meanwhile the Master Plan Bureaus
were closed down and their planning duties were transferred to
the Greater Municipalities. During the 1980s, local development
of residential zones was permitted by the Ankara Greater Munici-
pality on the western and southern fringes of the city. This was the
end of the controlled expansion of the city directed by the 1990
plan and the beginning of an uncontrolled sprawl, led by housing
investments. Moreover, the scale of the sprawl increased in the
2000s. While it was the individual housing projects that guided
the sprawl in the 1990s, the growth was directed by partial plan
revisions covering larger areas in the following decade. Some of
these revisions were later nulliﬁed by the courts due to their par-
tial character (Ankara Greater Municipality, 2007a, p. 52). In 2005,
Ankara’s municipal borders were expanded and redeﬁned within a
radius of 50 km. This meant that the area controlled by the munic-
ipality was enlarged by a factor of four (Fig. 5). Finally, a new plan
targeting 2023 was approved by the Municipality in 2007.Transportation
The incoming migration that escalated in the 1950s quickly ren-
dered the existing public transport system inadequate. The new-
comers soon invented their own solution in the form of dolmus,
informal taxis carrying multiple customers. The dolmus system
quickly became an indispensible component of the urban transport
system. The ﬁrst transportation study, which proposed a subway
system for Ankara for the ﬁrst time, was prepared in 1972. In the
same year domestic car production began and the share of private
cars in urban transportation reached that of mass transport in 1975
(Çubuk & Türkmen, 2003, p. 127). Although the idea to build a
Fig. 5. The municipal borders and the current settlement pattern in 2005 (source: Ankara Greater Municipality).
Fig. 6. An unused pedestrian overpass in downtown Ankara (source: Chamber of Architects Ankara Branch Archive).
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nomic constraints until the late 1980s.
In 1987, a comprehensive transportation study referring to the
1990 plan was ﬁnalized. Accordingly, a 55 km. subway system was
proposed, the ﬁrst phase of which would consist of a line tying
Kızılay to the new residential areas in the northeast. This
14.64 km. line was begun in 1993 and ﬁnished in 1997. It was alsosupplemented with a 7 km. light rail system running east–west
across the city center in 1996. The Ankara Transport Master Plan,
which proposed the construction of 130 km. of rail system by
2015, was approved in 1994 (Çubuk & Türkmen, 2003, pp. 136–
137). This was the last approved transportation plan made for
the city. Although the construction of three subway lines was be-
gun prior to the local elections in 2004, none was ﬁnished in
Table 2
Number of motorized vehicles in Ankara.
Year Overall number of vehicles Number of cars
2004 936,936 696,175
2005 1008,546 798,690
2006 1085,151 783,198
2007 1143,379 820,355
2008 1193,038 854,691
2009 1234,695 887,703
2010 1285,661 924,000
2011 (August) 1347,151 970,287
584 B. Batuman / Cities 31 (2013) 578–5902012. Moreover, the Greater Municipality handed over the con-
struction of the lines to the government in 2011, on the grounds
that the Municipal budget was not sufﬁcient to ﬁnish the projects.
The urban sprawl marking the city’s growth made trafﬁc a ma-
jor issue in the 1990s. The response of the Greater Municipality to
this problem was to implement partial regulations, all of which
encouraged vehicular trafﬁc. Between 1994 and 2009, 109 vehicu-
lar bridges and tunnels were built and the main arteries tying the
suburbs to the center were regularly widened. Within the same
period, 93 pedestrian overpasses were built in the city, 17 of which
were within the central hub (Öncü, 2009, p. 12). Pedestrian cross-
ings were cancelled and pedestrians were forced to use overpasses
(Fig. 6). The number of private cars increased 20% between 2005
and 2009 and reached 887,703, which corresponded to 191 private
cars per 1000 persons in Ankara, the highest rate among Turkish
cities (Table 2). In 2008, the share of public transport among An-
kara’s daily transportation modes was 69%, with dolmus still hav-
ing a 22% share and the subway system at only 7% (Ankara
Development Agency, 2011, p. 102).
Another development that went hand in hand with both the
suburbanization process and the promotion of vehicular trafﬁc in
the recent years is the increase in the number of shopping centers
in Ankara. The earliest in Ankara were located in the city center.
After the opening of the ﬁrst shopping center in 1989, only four
more were opened in the following decade. During the 2000s, how-
ever, the number increased and they began to choose locations on
the periphery. By the end of 2010, the number of shopping centers
reached 28, and while the ﬂoor area per 1000 persons in Turkey is
82 square meters, this ﬁgure is 215 square meters for Ankara,
which is higher than all of the European cities (Chamber of Archi-
tects Ankara Branch, 2011, p. 13).6 For the discussion of the political agency of urban professionals in Tukey, see
atuman (2008).
7Local administration
Traditionally, the results of local elections had always been con-
sistent with the general elections in Turkey; hence, the municipal-
ities were controlled by the party ruling the country. This pattern
also supported the perception of the municipalities as local
branches of the central government. Yet, in 1974, the resignation
of the coalition government led by the RPP created a new situation,
forcing the municipalities under the RPP to work in the face of con-
stant obstacles from the right-wing Nationalist Front govern-
ments.5 The clash between the municipalities under the RPP and
the Nationalist Front governments produced a demand for local
autonomy for the ﬁrst time in Turkish political history. Moreover,
a leftist municipal program was developed, which advocated work-
ing class participation in decision-making processes and introduced
measures reducing the cost of reproduction of urban labor power.
Ankara Municipality played a leading role among the RPP
municipalities in developing the municipal program. This occurred5 Although the RPP was the party that established the republic, in the 1960s it
declared its position at the ‘‘left of center’’.for a number of reasons, the ﬁrst of which was the existence of a
network of state institutions, universities and professional organi-
zations that housed left wing scholars and urban professionals in
Ankara.6 These individuals worked in collaboration with the Munic-
ipality and at times directly took part as mayoral consultants. The
second reason was that these experts worked in a relatively
autonomous environment (in institutions such as the Ankara Master
Plan Bureau) while their counterparts in Istanbul were under gov-
ernment pressure, due to global interest in Istanbul’s investment
opportunities.
As mentioned above, the municipalities were reorganized in the
1980s. The following era was characterized by the restructuring of
local governments and the changing modes in the production of
urban space. Both of these domains went through signiﬁcant trans-
formations, leading to the neoliberalization of the urban realm. As
Brenner and Theodore (2002) have pointed out with the concept of
‘‘actually existing neoliberalism,’’ even though by deﬁnition neo-
liberalism implicates a transnational mobility, as a structure it
translates into different experiences, as constrained by different
social and spatial limits. In this regard, it is necessary to detail this
transformation, which is key to understanding the contemporary
urban condition in Ankara.
In 1981, municipal revenues were raised with a new law and
the 1984 ‘‘Metropolitan Act’’ further expanded these revenues. As
mentioned earlier, the Greater Municipalities were granted plan-
ning powers within metropolitan areas that included a number of
district municipalities. With such expanded powers and resources,
the municipalities gradually became the major actors guiding large
investments in urban space and urban services, which became in
turn the major components of the urban economy.7 Contrary to
the legacy of the social democrat experiments of the 1970s, the
municipalities now chose to privatize collective consumption
services that were previously provided publicly. This went hand in
hand with the reduction of employment in the municipalities and
the curtailing of social beneﬁts of the municipal staff.
Some of the measures taken by almost all municipalities, begin-
ning from the mid-1980s, which attracted private investments in
urban economies, were the development of large areas at the
fringes by private companies, large scale projects in housing and
tourist resorts, the establishment of private schools and hospitals
and the opening of shopping malls. Three main characteristics de-
ﬁned the neoliberal reorganization of the municipalities in this
period: 1. extensive privatization of municipal services such as gar-
bage removal, street cleaning, maintenance of parks and public
spaces, etc. 2. allocation of municipal funds to private investors
via outsourcing, 3. use of unprecedented amounts of loans from na-
tional and foreign institutions (Dog˘an, 2008, p. 72–73).
In 1994, municipalities of 16 provincial centers and 6 metropol-
itan municipalities (including Ankara and Istanbul) were taken
over by the Islamist Welfare Party. The party also won the general
elections in 1995 and came to power with a coalition in 1996.
However, the government was forced to step down by the military
in 1997 and the party was closed down. In the 1999 local elections,
the municipalities controlled by Islamist mayors –this time under
the direction of the newly established Virtue Party – fell to 4
metropolitan municipalities (Ankara, Istanbul, Kayseri, Konya)
and 12 provincial centers. Nevertheless, as a consequence of these
two successive elections, from 1994 to 2004, almost half of the ur-
ban population in Turkey lived in cities controlled by Islamist localScholars have deﬁned the post-1980 period in Turkey as marked by ‘‘urbanization
f capital’’ (Sengül, 2001), ‘‘the transition from the city of petty capital to the city of
ig capital,’’ (Tekeli, 1982), and ‘‘the transition from smooth, integrative urbanization
tense, exclusionary urbanization’’ (Isık & Pınarcıog˘lu, 2001).B
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B. Batuman / Cities 31 (2013) 578–590 585governments. After 2004, this ratio would become even more pro-
nounced. When the Virtue Party was in turn closed down, the
Islamist movement split. While a group continued with traditional
Islamist arguments, a moderate faction established the Justice and
Development Party, which came to power in the general elections
in 2002. The JDP also had a sweeping victory in the 2004 local elec-
tions, winning 59 provincial centers out of 81 and 12 of 16 metro-
politan municipalities. The party maintained its dominance in
urban and national politics afterwards, with successive electoral
victories in 2007, 2009 and 2011.
The gradual rise of Islamism as a political force in Turkey has to
be understood in three phases: 1. early years of the 1990s in which
Islamism emerged as a radical movement by organizing especially
among the urban poor, 2. 1994–2002 when the major cities came
under the rule of Islamist mayors, 3. post-2002, the JDP coming
to power and the increasing dominance of neoliberal accumulation
strategies over Islamist ideological inclinations. In the ﬁrst phase,
the neoliberal restructuring characterized by privatizations, the
precarization of labor, as well as the chronically high level of inﬂa-
tion all resulted in increasing impoverishment, especially in the big
cities. While mainstream political parties remained impervious to
urban poverty, the Islamist cadres actively worked within the
squatter areas and established a network of aid and solidarity in
the early 1990s (Tug˘al, 2006; White, 2003). While this strategy al-
lowed them to gain control of local administrations in the major
cities, they utilized this power to further improve their aid network
as an original ‘‘welfare system’’ in the second phase. Municipalities
under the WP began to systematically distribute coal, food, bread
and clothing to households during the 1990s. Especially in the
early years, the economy created by these aids was disorganized
and shady. The control of aid distribution was handled together
with Islamist associations and through the municipalities’ charity
funds, which blurred the ﬂow of municipal funds and obscured
their monitoring. The lack of transparency was also true of the
donations made by businessmen to the municipalities’ charitable
funds and the favors granted in exchange (Bug˘ra, 2007, p. 47). In
the ﬁnal phase, that is after JDP’s coming to power in 2002, this
welfare system was formalized and integrated within the state
functions. With new legislation enacted in 2004, metropolitan
municipalities were assigned responsibilities and granted new
powers to provide social services and aid. Yet, the crucial aspect
of this ﬁnal episode is the primary role of accumulation strategies
depending on the production of urban space, rendering Islamist
solidarity secondary.
The rise of Islamists to power in Turkey owed very much to the
urban politics they have utilized. A major social force that sup-
ported the Islamist parties was the local bourgeoisie in small Ana-
tolian towns that enjoyed rapid development in connection with
the global market. While old industrial centers declined, these
new centers appeared as emerging industrial zones working in
close contact with the local administrations in their respective
localities. Small and medium scale ﬁrms working in labor-intense
ﬁelds built coalitions at the city scale and grew in mutual relation-
ship with the municipalities. In larger cities with reduced indus-
trial capacities, similar alliances tying the municipalities to local
investors also developed in two major ﬁelds: the municipal welfare
system itself, and the production of urban space with urban regen-
eration projects. As I will discuss urban regeneration within the to-
pic of housing, here I shall continue with the political economy of
aid distribution.
The distribution of aid in Ankara was handled with the methods
similar to those used by other municipalities. In the early years, the
Islamist associations were involved in the process both as favored
receivers of aid and as means of distribution. Unlicensed substan-
dard coal conﬁscated by the municipality was distributed to these
associations as well as the squatters (which resulted in noticeable
586 B. Batuman / Cities 31 (2013) 578–590increases in air pollution in the mid-1990s). The size of the aid as
well as its organization gradually expanded (Table 3). In addition
to the aid, centers were established to serve children, the elderly
and the disabled; these centers served 20,000 children, 14,000 se-
nior citizens and 16,000 with disabilities, between 1994 and 2004
(Danis & Albayrakog˘lu, 2009, pp. 103–104).
The supply of goods to be distributed to the urban poor from the
local market integrates not only the squatters but also the petty
producers, dealers, power brokers and even in-city transportation
companies to this power network at the center of which rests
the municipality. This cycle, then, reproduces a successful hege-
monic network linking both local businesses and the urban poor
through the utilization of municipal funds. Nevertheless, the cost
of this cycle is immense. As the urban poor receive some compen-
sation, these high prices mostly hit the middle-classes, incidentally
the most persistent opposition group to the Islamists. Moreover,
since the revenues of the municipalities are not enough to pay
for this economy, their chronic budget deﬁcits are overlooked by
the government. Especially after the JDP’s coming to power in
2002, the municipalities under the party’s control were in practice
allowed to disregard their debts to the Treasury.
In terms of handling the economic burden of the aid system, the
Ankara Greater Municipality was much more negligent than the
others. The actual living costs, especially the prices of urban ser-
vices such as public transportation, water and natural gas, are
the highest among all Turkish cities. Moreover, especially after
JDP’s coming to power in 2002, the Ankara Municipality has con-
sistently been the ﬁrst in the Treasury’s list of debtors. In 2007,
the municipality owed 3.8 billion TL ($2.9 billion) to the Treasury
while the overall debts of the municipalities were 12.9 billion TL.
By June 2010, these ﬁgures reached 4.7 and 14.6 billion, respec-
tively. Considering that the Municipality’s 2010 budget was
2.27 billion TL, the level of debt becomes clearly visible. In 2006,
the debts of the Ankara Municipality to BOTAS, the national natural
gas company, became a topic of public debate as it caused the com-
pany to raise gas prices. During the summers of 2006 and 2007, An-
kara witnessed drought although the amount of precipitation was
not below seasonal trends. It quickly became apparent that the
main reason was the failure of the Municipality to realize invest-
ments in water systems proposed by State Water Works for years
(Yıldız, 2009, p. 75). As mentioned above, a major failure in terms
of infrastructural investments was the handing over of the three
unﬁnished subway lines to the Ministry of Transportation in
2011. Despite these very obvious defects, the urban hegemony
established by the municipality managed to keep the mayor in of-
ﬁce for a fourth term in the 2009 local elections.
Housing
The intensifying urbanization brought about extreme levels of
land speculation with drastic increase in land values in Ankara in
the 1950s. With increased infrastructure costs, it became virtually
impossible for the middle-income groups to own a house in the
city center, thus they settled in the areas with appropriate land
prices. In the absence of ﬂat ownership, it was not possible for indi-
viduals to build high rise apartment blocks single-handedly. With-
in this context, small contractors organizing the capital of a
number of individuals emerged as important agents of urban
development. In the absence of an advanced sector with large-scale
capital and high construction technology, they performed low-cap-
ital intensive activities with non-unionized, low wage labor. Taking
advantage of high inﬂation, cheap labor as well as the continuous
demand for housing, they made high proﬁts in the short run
(Öncü, 1988, pp. 50–53).88 For a discussion of the politics of housing in the 1970s, see Batuman (2006).While the small contractors served the urban middle-classes,
squatting emerged as the informal housing method and a survival
strategy for the urban poor. These two primary methods of housing
production, namely the construction of apartments by small con-
tractors and the self-help gecekondus of the squatters, dominated
the urbanization process in Turkish cities up until 1980s. Both of
these spontaneous processes were regulated by the state in the
mid-1960s (Tekeli, 1993, p. 6–7). The 1965 ‘‘Flat Ownership Act’’
for the ﬁrst time organized the ownership of apartments in a single
building, further facilitating housing production by small contrac-
tors. The 1966 ‘‘Gecekondu Act’’, on the other hand, proposed cer-
tain measures recognizing the existence of squatter settlements
and trying to avoid the building of new ones. Nevertheless, the
Act was unsuccessful in preventing the expansion of squatter set-
tlements. While the number of squatter houses in Ankara was esti-
mated at 70,000 in 1960, the number reached 240 000 in 1980. The
squatter population rose from 250 000 to 5 750 000 between 1955
and 1980, which corresponded to 4.7% and 26.1% of the urban pop-
ulation nationally. By the 1960s, the number of squatters reached
half of the urban population in the ﬁve largest cities (Keles, 2004,
pp. 561–563). In 1965, 65% of the urban population in Ankara
was living in squatter settlements (Akçura, 1971, p. 57).
By the mid-1970s, the supply of land in Ankara’s center, as well
as its immediate surroundings, had been depleted. This was due to
the high-rise residential developments in the center and the pur-
chase of peripheral lots by large companies. This shortage was re-
ﬂected in land prices as well as house rents, raising both.
Meanwhile, the cost of construction materials escalated enor-
mously. And ﬁnally, the high rate of inﬂation that used to be ben-
eﬁcial for the contractors reached a level which required increased
rates of cash down-payments and installments (Tekeli, 1982;
Öncü, 1988). Under these conditions, it became impossible—that
is, unproﬁtable—for small contractors to serve the urban middle-
classes. The process of squatting was also experiencing a bottle-
neck. As squatting was characterized by the occupation of land,
its absence around the cities made it impossible to ﬁnd places to
occupy. While small contractors could not ﬁnd lots to build, large
companies preferred land speculation which was more proﬁtable
than housing production. That is, all channels of housing produc-
tion were blocked towards the end of the 1970s.
This bottleneck in housing production was overcome through
suburbanization on the western fringes and the surplus rent cre-
ated by the transformation of squatter areas. As mentioned above,
Ankara had already begun to develop to the west and this develop-
ment was directed by private developers, especially in the south-
west. During the process of sprawl, the upper classes deliberately
left the city core for the suburbs. The middle classes were also in-
volved in the suburban move especially via housing cooperatives,
which worked as a means of distribution of urban rent in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s. In the meantime, the gecekondu were trans-
formed into a commodity with building amnesties turning the
squatters into true land speculators. This transformation was espe-
cially encouraged by the amnesty in 1984, which led to a compre-
hensive redevelopment of squatter areas in the form of 4 and 5
storey apartments. While the squatters were given shares from
the surplus rent, this renewal trend contributed to the recovery
of small scale contractors (Türel, 1994). Urban space was used as
a means for economic recovery and a tool for the politics of
clientelism.
In 2004, urban regeneration became a legal term in Turkish leg-
islation. A Law was passed speciﬁcally for Ankara, which deﬁned
an urban regeneration project for the squatter areas in northern
Ankara. According to the project, an area of 16 million square me-
ters containing 10,500 gecekondus was to be redeveloped. The
evacuation process was rather peaceful since the squatters were
promised to move in by 2008, although none has moved in since
Table 4
TOKI Projects in Ankara between 2003–2010 (Source: TOKI, 2011a, 2011b).
Level of
completeness
Number of
projects
Schools Gyms Dormitories Local
healthcare
Hospitals Trade
centers
Mosques Libraries Nurseries Social
facilities
Housing
units
100% 48 23 10 5 13 9 2 3 3 17,739
96–99% 39 23 6 1 7 16 14 3 3 19,929
50–95% 51 15 1 4 10 8 1 7 18,232
1–49% 36 19 1 1 4 7 3 5,480
Total 174 80 17 1 13 5 43 38 5 7 13 61,380
Total number for Turkey 686 715 67 88 183 407 319 38 7 69 500,000
Table 5
Urban Regeneration Projects of Ankara Greater Municipality. (Source: Ankara Greater
Municipality, 2011b).
Year Number of projects Total area (ha)
2005 21 13,042,80
2007 45 29,911,73
2010 55 34,284,80
B. Batuman / Cities 31 (2013) 578–590 587the buildings were not ﬁnished as of late 2011. It is planned to con-
struct 8100 houses for the squatters themselves and 21,000 extra
units. A large portion of the project area was deﬁned exclusively
as an upper class residential zone with a vast recreation area
(Gümüs, 2010, p. 18). In 2005, new legislation was introduced that
would allow the renewal of ‘‘degraded historic sites’’ which would
effectively pave the way for the gentriﬁcation of the old center. In
the same year, the Municipalities Act was renewed and Greater
Municipalities were granted powers to plan and redevelop areas
deemed necessary. In 2010, these powers were further expanded.
In 2003, TOKI, the Housing Development Administration, which
was established in 1984 with the objective to construct social
housing, was granted new powers. Accordingly, the Administration
was allowed to establish companies, execute projects to create
new funds, and use public land without charge. With a series of
regulations, institutions and administrations responsible for hous-
ing and land development (such as the Undersecretariat of Housing
and the Land Ofﬁce) were closed down and their duties and assets
were handed over to TOKI. In 2004, the administration was granted
planning authority in the areas that would be redeveloped. More-
over, with the same legislation, it gained the power to determine
the value of expropriation in squatter areas. In 2007, the dutiesFig. 7. The urban regeneration zonesof the Ministry of Public Works regarding gecekondu prevention
and slum clearance were also transferred to TOKI. With these reg-
ulations, the administration became exempt from almost all of the
bureaucratic mechanisms and could freely expropriate, plan and
redevelop areas. Moreover, it became the major actor in housing
production and the main facilitator of public private partnership.
As a result, the number of houses built by TOKI between 2003
and 2010 reached 500 000, while this number was merely 43,000
for the period 1984–2003 (TOKI, 2011a). In addition, the Adminis-
tration undertook construction activities to raise funds wherever it
deemed proﬁtable.
TOKI has been involved in the urban regeneration projects pur-
sued by both Ankara Greater Municipality and the district munic-
ipalities in the city. The projects implemented in Ankara by TOKIin Ankara (source: Sargın, 2012).
Fig. 8. High-rise blocks built by TOKI in the squatter areas (source: Chamber of Architects Ankara Branch Archive).
9 For examples of such stories, see the web site of the ‘‘Right to Shelter Bureau’’
stablished in Dikmen Valley, the site of an ongoing clash over the regeneration of the
rea: http://www.dikmenvadisi.org/.
0 The discussions in this section have previously appeared in Batuman (2009b).
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2011a, 2011b). Nevertheless, there are also projects that do not
yet have clear data regarding the facilities to be built. These pro-
jects are only deﬁned with their ‘‘regeneration zones’’ as delineated
by the decrees of the Municipal Assembly (Table 5). The total area
classiﬁed as regeneration zones by Ankara Greater Municipality is
currently more than 34,000 ha., which is approximately 14% of the
metropolitan area (Fig. 7). It is clearly visible that urban regenera-
tion has become the predominant apparatus of space production,
which has signiﬁcantly changed the scale of urban development,
thus rendering independent small contractors outmoded. Public
land is developed with the collaboration of TOKI and respective
municipalities, expropriation of squatter areas is pursued on terms
deﬁned by these agents and the surplus rent is redistributed to pri-
vate investors undertaking construction. Meanwhile, squatters are
left with the choice to either move out or use the expropriation
money as a downpayment and take TOKI loans to own a new
apartment in the same area. Hence, the major aspect of this strat-
egy is the immense powers vested in TOKI and the greater munic-
ipalities, which results in two striking consequences: the
maximization of proﬁt and the lack of public participation in deci-
sion-making processes. The disregard for environmental concerns
and the demands of inhabitants living in the regeneration areas
have been major issues of criticism and led to the cancellation of
a signiﬁcant portion of these projects by courts (Fig. 8). The court
rulings, in turn, led to new legislation expanding the legal powers
of TOKI and the municipalities.
In sum, three main methods can be identiﬁed in the urban
regeneration projects pursued in Ankara. The ﬁrst method is the
development of hitherto undeveloped land on the fringes. The sec-
ond method is the renewal of public spaces and historic sites in the
urban core, especially the old center of Ulus and the open spaces
that were created with the Jansen Plan. These are subject to regen-
eration proposals, which are hot issues resulting in a legal struggle
between the municipality and professional organizations. The third
method is the evacuation and redevelopment of squatter areas
which were once peripheral but now remain within the city and
have gained value due to urban sprawl (Güzey, 2009). Here, the
powers vested in the municipality materialize in the form of coer-
cion against the squatters. The municipal authority embarks upon
signing individual contracts with each household in the area, and
hence by instigating the atomization of the squatters, creates an
extreme case of ‘‘regeneration sans participation.’’
The transformations of gecekondu areas have led to serious
clashes between the municipality and the squatters resisting evac-
uation. Especially in the traditional squatter districts of Ankara,
squatters have organized and demanded participation in the deci-
sions regarding the regeneration projects. While in some examplesthe squatters succeeded in negotiating more advantageous terms,
in some cases they managed to cancel the projects through court
decisions. In some districts the Municipality attempted to evacuate
neighborhoods by force, which was met by resistance. In such
areas, the tension prevails.9Conclusion: urban politics at large10
The urban history of Ankara throughout the 20th century dis-
plays a gradual move away from planned and controlled develop-
ment. Following the city’s declaration as the Turkish capital,
attempts were made to build a modern city that would serve as
a model for urban development across the country. Yet the contin-
uous migration on the one hand and the pressure of land specula-
tion on the other signiﬁcantly reduced the effectiveness of plans, as
well as the institutions responsible for controlling urban growth to
conform to these plans. As a result, especially in the postwar era,
the city witnessed rapid spontaneous growth and the endeavors
to cope with it. This trend came to an end after the 1980s, with
the abandonment of the determination to control urban develop-
ment. Although planning prevailed as a legal obligation, partial
revision plans and plan modiﬁcations have become signiﬁcant
means to get around limitations. It is crucial to note that although
this tendency gained impetus in the recent years, it is by no means
peculiar to the current administration. For instance, 3954 revision
plans and modiﬁcations were approved in Ankara between 1985
and 2005, which corresponds to an average of 200 modiﬁcations
per year (Sahin, 2007, p. 208). As this ﬁgure illustrates, the failure
of holistic planning efforts has been a signiﬁcant issue that pre-
cedes the current government and the present mayor.
Nevertheless, the Islamist success in urban politics opened a
new era characterized by the juxtaposition of neoliberal policies
and social welfare mechanisms. This model made it possible to
ease the impoverishing effects of neoliberalization and also
strengthened the Islamist networks within civil society. While all
the cities were ruled in the same fashion, there were also differ-
ences resulting from the historical speciﬁcities of individual cities.
In this regard, it has to be noted that certain peculiarities identiﬁed
with the personality of Mayor Gökçek, who has been ruling Ankara
since 1994, are worth mentioning. The distinguishing feature of
Gökçek’s administration has been his pragmatic rather than doctri-
naire interpretation of Islamism. While other WP mayors at-
tempted to implement radical policies and made publice
a
1
Fig. 9. The city emblems of Ankara. The stylized version of the Hittite sun disk
began to be used as the city emblem in 1973. It was replaced with the second
emblem, superimposing a mosque silhouette and Atakule, a landmark that
dominates the city’s skyline, in 1995. The continuous public debate resulted in
the cancellation of this emblem by a court order in 2009. Nevertheless, the mayor
declined to use the old emblem and produced this version in 2011.
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Gökçek’s pragmatism functioned as a galvanizing force, bringing
together different strands of the Turkish right under the umbrella
of Islamist discourse. The key to Gökçek’s pragmatic populism
was embedded in the urban collective memory of Ankara. As
shown earlier, Ankara was the locus of the republican project of
modernization and for long has been the national symbol of this
modernization effort. It was also the major setting of the 1970s ef-
forts in social democratic municipal governance. Hence, the ideo-
logical discourse of the Gökçek era has depended upon a reaction
to both the radical modernization efforts of the early republican
period (especially on the part of Islamists) and to the 1970s leftist
movements (especially on the part of anti-communist national-
ists).11 Building his performance on political tension, Mayor Gökçek
has constantly clashed with opposition groups (including NGOs, pro-
fessional organizations, universities and even district municipalities)
as well as the administrative courts cancelling his projects, accusing
them of acting ‘‘ideologically.’’12
An overall evaluation of the role played by the municipality in
the current urban condition in Ankara reveals the increasing power
of the local administration over social relations in the city. The ur-
ban regeneration projects and the municipal welfare system
emerge as instruments creating an imbalanced power relation be-
tween the municipality and the urban residents. Within the urban
regeneration processes, the local government assumes the role of
an authoritarian executive power rather than being a participatory
domain of urban politics. On the one hand it reallocates funds
through the distribution of aid and the large scale regeneration
projects; on the other, it compensates the living costs of the urban
poor with its welfare system. As this redistribution network sup-
ports the political hegemony of the Islamist administration, those
raising demands regarding issues of collective consumption appear
as dissidents harming social coherence.
The crucial point regarding the municipal welfare system is pre-
cisely the opacity of the selection of both the providers and the
receivers of aid. While such opacity serves the utilization of this
system for clientelistic partisanship, it also creates the impression
that the social aid provided by the municipality is the result of
benevolence (of the mayors) rather than the fulﬁllment of citizens’
rights. As underlined by Bug˘ra (2008), social policies that are based
upon charity conceal the fact that in essence they are rights born11 Dog˘an (2005) uses the term ‘‘revanchism’’ to deﬁne Mayor Gökçek’s ideologica
performance, cf. Neil Smith’s (1998) use referring to Mayor Giuliani’s administration
in New York.
12 A signiﬁcant case of Gökçek’s antagonistic attitude was his changing of the city
emblem with the support of right-wing members of the municipal assembly. The old
emblem referring to ancient Anatolian civilizations was replaced with a stylized
mosque silhouette. Despite public protests and a court order cancelling his new
emblem, Gökçek refused to re-use the old emblem and recently introduced a third
emblem, which is a replica of the earlier one with small changes in the details (Fig. 9)l
.out of popular struggles. This, in return, destroys consciousness
regarding the right to the city and the public life that requires cit-
izens’ participation as organized interest groups raising demands.
The result is the emergence of a ‘‘precarious publicness’’ (Dog˘an,
2008), within which participation in the urban social life is no
longer deﬁned by urbanites’ political rights and free will, but
through a hegemonic network of subordination that captures
them.
It has to be noted that this new urban hegemony exists within
actual spaces of the city; that is, the production of space also con-
tributes to the making of this hegemony. As Islamic neoliberalism,
and the urban condition it has produced, transformed public life,
the very same transformation is further supported by spatial
instruments. The city, which should have been understood as a
network of public spaces, is rapidly turning into another sort of
network, in which the rich and the poor built their own ghettoes
and fortiﬁed themselves with their own kind, creating distinct pat-
terns of consumption (Akpınar, 2009). On the one hand, suburban
neighborhoods are rising as enclosed socio-spatial systems, and
new gated communities sprawl on the erstwhile urban periphery
with unprecedented speed. On the other hand, the urban core is
being emptied, wherein both the functions of the center and the
gecekondu population, residing in areas that are deemed unﬁt by
the authorities, are pushed out of the city’s heart. While squatters
are denied participation in the decision processes regarding their
own living environments, public spaces deteriorate parallel to
the decline of the city center. The basic identity of the urbanite,
being a pedestrian, is negated in the city center; the downtown
is prepared for new urban transformation cycles by rendering it
unsafe.
The production of space is currently a process that has achieved
a life of its own in Ankara. Neither housing projects, nor trafﬁc
investments, nor even the construction of shopping centers follow
any kind of plans or projections based on the actual needs of the
urban population. Although the city is enjoying a period of eco-
nomic development founded on the exploitation of urban space,
the city as a social entity is suffering disintegration. This dual trend
seems to last until the economic cycle becomes unsustainable.References
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